Firas Elias / Professor of Strategy at the University of Mosul
The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December has ushered in a new regional reality. Regional countries, including Iraq, have begun to assess the areas of gain and loss resulting from the collapse of Assad’s regime. Historically, Iraqi-Syrian relations have been among the most complex in the region, characterized by fluctuations between conflict and cooperation. However, what is certain is that these relations have never progressed at a singular pace, particularly after Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad assumed power in their respective countries. During that period, relations between Iraq and Syria became some of the most tense in the Middle East, especially during the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s, when Syria sided with Iran.
After the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Syria invested in post-occupation Iraq by sending dozens of militants into the country. The goal was to obstruct the US strategy in Iraq and to deter the United States from targeting Damascus and Tehran after the occupation of Baghdad, especially since the administration of former US President George W. Bush had classified Syria and Iran, along with Iraq, as part of the “Axis of Evil” in the Middle East. As a result of Syria’s actions in Iraq, a major clash erupted between Syria and Iraq, particularly when former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki held Bashar al-Assad’s regime responsible for the bloody bombings that occurred in Baghdad from 2007 to 2010.
However, the situation changed after 2011. The outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in Syria marked a qualitative shift in Iraqi-Syrian relations, with sectarian realities becoming the basis for reshaping ties between the two countries. Iran played a significant role in reinforcing this shift by linking the stability of Iraq’s political system with the survival of Syria. The threat posed by Syrian opposition forces to the Assad regime was viewed as a threat to Iraq’s political system, to the survival of the Alawites in Syria, and to the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran in the region. This connection prompted the Iraqi government to open the borders with Syria and send thousands of fighters, weapons, and equipment to prevent the fall of Assad’s regime at the hands of opposition forces.
Many Iraqi armed factions participated in the conflict under the banner of “defending the sanctities” in Syria. These factions also sought to secure a land corridor linking with Hezbollah in Lebanon, extending from Tehran through Iraq and Syria to reach Beirut. In this context, Iraq played the role of a regional bridge, contributing to repairing the cracks in Syria’s regime, which had been exhausted by the war.
The sudden fall of Assad’s regime, along with the withdrawal of both Iran and Russia from Syria, left post-Assad Syria facing major challenges that might resemble those Iraq encountered after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The only difference may be that Syria today enjoys a level of regional and international engagement that Iraq did not experience in the past. What remains most important, however, is the future that awaits Iraq after the fall of the Assad regime, and how Iraq’s political decision-makers will respond to this new regional variable.
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