Dr. Imad Moayed Jasim Al-Marsoumi: Professor at the College of Law and Political Science, University of Diyala
When the Islamic State (ISIS) seized parts of northern and western Iraq in mid-2014, the Iraqi government, in collaboration with the international community, provided assistance to popular and tribal groups that volunteered to fight the organization. This assistance, administered through official state institutions, included training programs, equipment, and supplies to arm these volunteer forces against the imminent threat posed by ISIS.
The security turmoil experienced by such countries, coupled with their liberation efforts, creates a favorable environment for the empowerment of groups that played a central role in the liberation process and in repelling threats. This empowerment often enables these groups to gain access to the official military establishment or integrate into the political system, including entry into parliament and positions of power. Consequently, countries that endured a war crisis with a terrorist organization occupying parts of their territory for years, and where the government’s military efforts to reclaim these areas relied on popular support and volunteer contributions to the armed forces, often face the challenge of managing a complex relationship with these newly empowered actors. Navigating the post-liberation phase requires finding appropriate ways to address the evolving security and political landscape that emerges after the conflict (Post-Conflict Environment).
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have introduced a new qualitative element to the Iraqi military structure, as their formation was ideologically driven and rooted in a religious fatwa. However, their emergence has brought about contentious issues stemming from the duality they created within the security sector. This duality has begun to effect significant changes in the balance of political and military power in the country.
Although the Iraqi parliament passed Law No. 40 of 2016, which established the Popular Mobilization Authority as an independent entity with legal personality and designated it as part of the Iraqi armed forces under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as stipulated in Article 1 of the law, the gradual institutionalization of the PMF within the state apparatus has not been sufficient to alleviate the tensions surrounding its presence in the military-security sphere.
This authority has faced resentment from certain political forces, and elements within the traditional armed forces have also been less than welcoming. Their concerns largely stem from fears of a security structure comprising a regular army juxtaposed with a powerful paramilitary entity.
On this basis, the complexity the state faced within the security sector and the evolving security environment extended beyond finding a compromise between the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iraqi army. This duality not only provoked significant external opposition but also introduced new challenges to the state’s efforts to reform the security sector. These reforms were intended to progress alongside the war on ISIS and evolve further after its conclusion.
In addition to addressing the flaws within the traditional security sector—flaws that had been a major factor in ISIS’s expansion and occupation of parts of Iraq—the state was also tasked with developing an institutional relationship with the Popular Mobilization Forces. This necessitated finding an appropriate solution to integrate them into the broader security reform project, ensuring alignment with the state’s objectives for a cohesive and effective security framework.
The reform process was challenging and complex, experiencing halts or suspensions over time due to the multilayered nature of its implementation. These complexities unfolded across three levels: the first level concerned the Peshmerga forces, supervised by the international coalition forces; the second involved the federal security establishment, managed by the government in Baghdad; and the third addressed the challenge of integrating reform initiatives between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the federal government. Additionally, the process had to tackle the unique status of the Popular Mobilization Forces and establish a structured relationship between them and the traditional security establishment.
On this basis, this study aims to evaluate the reality of past attempts and limited efforts to reform the security sector, as well as the obstacles they encountered, in order to provide an objective assessment of the policies needed to reform and enhance the sector. It is important to clarify that this study does not aim to define the operational policies the armed forces should adopt in response to specific threats. Instead, its focus is on identifying the organizational and operational requirements that the security sector must fulfill to address the deficiencies that have weighed on it in previous years.
